PROPOSAL TO THE AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION 1999

EXTENSION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TOWARDS SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH TEAMS

APPENDIX 01
EXCERPTS

EXCERPTS of FREUD'S TEXT

Excerpt (A), from Civilization and Its Discontents (1930)

In Chap. VIII

I believe the line of thought which seeks to trace in the phenomena of cultural development the part played by a super-ego promises still further discoveries. I hasten to come to a close. But there is one question which I can hardly evade. If the development of civilization has such a far-reaching similarity to the development of the individual and if it employs the same methods, may we not be justified in reaching the diagnosis that, under the influence of cultural urges, some civilizations, or some epochs of civilization--possibly the whole of mankind--have become 'neurotic'. An analytic dissection of such neuroses might lead to therapeutic recommendations which could lay claim to great practical interest. I would not say that an attempt of this kind to carry psyche-analysis over to the cultural community was absurd or doomed to be fruitless. But we should have to be very cautious and not forget that, after all, we are only dealing with analogies and that it is dangerous, not only with men but also with concepts, to tear them from the sphere in which they have originated and been evolved. Moreover, the diagnosis of communal neuroses is faced with a special difficulty. In an individual neurosis we lake as our starting-point the contrast that distinguishes the patient from his environment, which is assumed to be 'normal'. For a group all of whose members are affected by one and the same disorder no such background could exist; it would have to be found elsewhere. And as regards the therapeutic application of our knowledge, what would be the use of the most correct analysis of social neuroses, since no one possesses authority to impose such a therapy upon the group? But in spite of all these difficulties, we may expect that one day someone will venture to embark upon a pathology of cultural communities.

Excerpt (B) from Moses and Monotheism (1938)

In Part III \ Section I \ V. Difficulties :

In fact it seems to me convincing enough to allow me to venture further and assert that the archaic heritage of mankind includes not only dispositions but also ideational contents, memory traces of the experiences of former generations. In this way the extent as well as the significance of the archaic heritage would be enhanced in a remarkable degree.

On second thoughts I must admit that I have argued as if there were no question that there exists an inheritance of memory--traces of what our fore-fathers experienced, quite independently of direct communication and of the influence of education by example. When I speak of an old tradition still alive in a people, of the formation of a national character, it is such an inherited tradition, and not one carried on by word of mouth, that I have in mind. Or at least I did not distinguish between the two, and was not quite clear about what a bold step I took by neglecting this difference. This state of affairs is made more difficult, it is true, by the present attitude of biological science, which rejects the idea of acquired qualities being transmitted to descendants. I admit, in all modesty, that in spite of this I cannot picture biological development proceeding without taking this factor into account. The two cases, it is true, are not quite similar; with the former, it is a question of acquired qualities that are hard to conceive; with the latter, memory traces of external expressions, something almost concrete. Probably, however, we cannot au fond imagine one without the other. If we accept the continued existence of such memory traces in our archaic inheritance, then we have bridged the gap between individual and mass psychology and can treat peoples as we do the individual neurotic. Though we may admit that for the memory traces in our archaic inheritance we have so far no stronger proof than those remnants of memory evoked by analytic work, which call for a derivation from phylogenesis, yet this proof seems to me convincing enough to postulate such a state of affairs. If things are different, then we are unable to advance one step further on our way, either in psychoanalysis or in mass psychology. It is bold, but inevitable.

In making this postulate we also do something else. We diminish the over-wide gap human arrogance in former times created between man and beast. If the so-called instincts of animal--which from the very beginning allow them to behave in their new conditions of living as if they were old and long-established ones--if this instinctual life of animals permits of any explanation at all, it can only be this: that they carry over into their new existence the experience of their kind; this is to say, that they have preserved in their minds memories of what their ancestors experienced. In the human animal things should not be fundamentally different.